Judge Frederic Block expressly acknowledged, this case is the first in which a court in the US has had to adjudicate on whether works of exterior graffiti art, given their inherent transient nature, are worthy of legal protection.
Graffiti and the Law.
Traditional assumptions about graffiti are generally premised on the presumption that such works are illegal, accordingly the Oxford English Dictionary definition is thus, 'Writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed illicitly on a wall or other surface in a public place'. 8 But as an art form graffiti has evolved from an indicator of urban decline to become a widely accepted and acknowledge form of artistic self-expression. 9 The vocabulary in the discourse around such art has migrated from that related to gang's territorial marking and acts of vandalism to that of the masterpiece, the recent sale of Banksy's work 'Kissing Coppers' for over half a million dollars again confirming this new found status. 10 It is also now the case that much contemporary graffiti, as in the case at hand, is painted legally.
Legal graffiti has been held copyrightable in the US 11 once it satisfies the criteria of being an original work of authorship that is fixed in 'a tangible medium of expression.' 12 Copyright Law has often been professed to remain content neutral at least in terms of express restrictions but it is arguable that the strength of this assertion has varied at any given time. The New York District Court has previously held that works are not eligible for copyright protection if a work is not original or 'free from illegality to immorality' 13 but more recent decisions have held illegal works may be eligible for protection. 14 The current position could safely be described as uncertain. It is a fact however that 'the assertion that illegal graffiti is barred from copyright protection is an untested one, as no court has held directly on the legality requirement vis-a-vis graffiti art.' 15 In the instant case however there was general agreement that the graffiti in question was created with permission.
VARA's moral rights provisions have been held to apply only to legal graffiti. 16 Under VARA a work of visual art is defined as 'a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies' but as not including 'any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work…'. 17 As stated, for the 8 Oxford English Dictionary (3 rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2010) 9 http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/consider-this/Consider-This-blog/2013/10/15/how-hasgraffitievolved.html accessed on 08/03/2014 10 http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/news/banksys-kissing-coppers-sells-for-575000-atmiami-street-art-auction-9138032. 1991) where it was held that state moral rights provision applied only to legally created artworks, the court stating, 'It obviously does not apply to graffiti, which…is hardly classifiable as "fine art", (and) which is the subject of several criminal laws.' 17 17 USC §101 purposes of moral rights relating to destruction, the work must be of a 'recognized stature', it is this aspect of the statute that occupied the court most during the hearing for injunctive relief.
The Decision:
The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction under the provisions a 17 USC §106 A(a)(3)(b) of VARA, the moral rights provisions protecting the integrity of an artwork, which allow for protection against the destruction of the work in certain circumstances. The plaintiff's further sought to argue that their prospective contractual relations had been tortuously interfered with by the defendants and also that Jonathan Cohen has an easement in gross to use the buildings but these latter arguments were dismissed as meritless. On November 12, 2013, the application for injunction was refused and a written opinion on the matter was delivered on November 20, 2013. On the November 19, 2013, the plaintiffs' counsel filed a letter with the court to confirm that 'under the cover of darkness' the previous night all the visual art at 5 Pointz had been whitewashed over by the defendants. 18 The primary issues that the District Court focused on were those of whether the works in question were of the necessary 'recognised stature' to engage the relevant VARA moral rights provisions and secondly, whether the inherent transient nature of the graffiti at hand would mitigate against the granting of injunctive relief.
Recognised Stature:
The plaintiffs adduced 24 photographs of works that had been present on the walls of 5 Pointz which they argued were of the requisite 'recognised stature'. VARA does not define 'recognised stature' and the District court sought to delineate the boundaries of the term by first referencing both the District 19 and Second Circuit decisions in Carter v Helmsley-Spear Inc. 20 Interestingly, rather than view the aforementioned VARA protection against the destruction of works of 'recognised stature' as a subset of the integrity right, the Second Circuit saw this protection as conceptually a separate right from the general integrity right. 21 The district court decision in Carter provided a two tier test for the determination of the stature of a work. Firstly, '(1) that the visual art in question has 'stature' i.e. is viewed meritorious, and (2) that this stature is 'recognised' by art experts, other members of the artistic community, or by some cross-section of society. The final version of this paper was published by Edward Elgar in the Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property (2014) Volume 4(3), p226-235.
work was not of recognised stature because while it was 'unquestionably meritorious' it was 'intended solely as a display piece for a one-time event.' 25 The court further stated that 'it defies the underlying purpose of VARA to assume that the statute was intended to protect works of artistic merit without regard to whether such works were ever intended to be preserved for posterity as works of artistic merit.' 26 Lastly, in Scott v Dixon a statue housed in a secluded back garden was not deemed to attract protection as 'while the Sculpture may have artistic merit, it was not a work of recognised stature within the meaning of VARA', this as a result of the fact that it had not been exposed to the public.
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Much of the testimony in relation to the 24 selected 5 Pointz works did not differentiate between the two 'discreet words' but did on the whole equate artistic merit with 'recognised stature.' 28 One of the plaintiffs, Danielle Mastrion, stated that her work 'Kool Herc' (one of the 24 works presented by the plaintiffs) was of recognised stature as it satisfied criteria such as 'technical ability, composition, color, line work, detail and also the artist's credentials'. 29 However the testimony of art experts from both sides in the case did focus on the issue of public recognition the works.
Professor Erin Thompson for the defence stated that while quality is undoubtedly a factor in stature, that more correctly 'stature is recognizing not particular qualities of objects, but the way these objects are valued by the public.' 30 She further stated that while innovation and uniqueness in a work should be of a threshold where scholars agree that the work is 'changing the history of art', she testified that none of the works in question met this standard. 31 The fact that 5 Pointz had achieved a wide recognition as a tourist attraction did not in in itself satisfy VARA according to Thompson Works Duration:
The court heard that Jerry Wolkoff had been emphatic, when he and Cohen made their 2002 agreement, stating that he was ultimately 'going to be knocking the building down' and the arrangement 'was always temporary'. 41 Cohen on the other hand testified there had been no discussion of life span but acknowledged that he did have fear for the longevity of the arrangement. 42 Cohen stated that there was a hierarchy of works at 5Pointz, on certain walls the art was temporary and quickly rotating and could last from a day to a week, other works however were deemed to be 'permanent', meaning they would last as long as he and the current set up was there, the artist being the only one with the authority to remove it. 43 At the time the injunction was sought 5 Pointz housed about 350 images, 100 of them Cohen's. Evidence was also produced of a 2011 video interview with Cohen where he acknowledged the transient nature of the works in question. 44 It was also noted by the court that Mastrion's 'Kool Herc' was painted in July 2013 and that the artist was aware both of the general fact that the building could come down and at any time, and more specifically was aware that the owners were actively seeking approval for demolition approval at the time she created the work.
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Refusal of Injunctive Relief:
Judge Block cited Picasso's statement that 'the purpose of art is washing the dust of daily life off our souls' and speculated that such an artist would have wishes VARA protection for contemporary aerosol art. 46 But he continued that VARA only protects works of art and does not grant the authority to preserve tourist sites. 47 He did however acknowledge that at least some of the works in question presented 'sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them fair grounds for litigation' but held that the trial rather than the preliminary injunction stage was more a more appropriate setting for determining the issue of whether the works were of recognised stature.
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The final version of this paper was published by Edward Elgar in the Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property (2014) Volume 4(3), p226-235.
In determining whether the plaintiffs had suffered irreparable harm and were therefore entitled to an injunction the court stated that:
'[a]lthough the works have now been destroyed -and the Court wished it had the power to preserve them -the plaintiffs would be hard pressed to contend that no amount of money would compensate them for their paintings; and VARA -which makes no distinction between temporary and permanent works of visual art-provides significant monetary damages may be awarded for their wrongful destruction.'
49
The court emphasised the difference between the 5 Pointz art works and more traditional ones that are more readily marketable, but did stress the fact that the plaintiffs' works can live on through other media through which they may enjoy copyright protection.
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In the context of examining the issues of irreparable harm and the balance of hardships, the determinate factor in the court's failure to grant an injunction was 'the transient nature of the plaintiffs' work.' 51 The court stated that Cohen always knew the building would be coming down also placed importance on the fact that many painting were recently created while the plaintiffs knew that the City Planning Commission had approved the defendant's redevelopments plans. In this sense the court stated, 'In a very real sense, (the) plaintiffs' have created their own hardships.'
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The court stated that the defendants do bear some of the responsibility given the fact that gave the project their blessing but did not seek VARA waivers. 53 It was also noted that the defendants stood to benefit economically from the attention that the site had attracted in terms of marketing his new premises. 54 Judge Block reiterated that VARA protects temporary works from destruction and as a result the 'defendants are exposed to potentially significant monetary damages if it is ultimately determined after trial that the plaintiffs' works were of 'recognised stature.'
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In terms of the public interest, the court stated that the City Planning Commission was requiring that 3,300 square feet of the new development on the site was to be made available for art. 56 It was stated that should more space be given toward this end and if Cohen was allowed to continue in his curatorial role that the court may find such gestures persuasive when and if the issue of financial damages is to be addressed and that such moves may lead to a reincarnation for 5 Pointz. 57 Injunctive relief in this case was not given on the basis of the transient nature of the works but yet VARA does give protection to temporary works, as a result damages may be accruing to plaintiffs. It remains to be seen if the case proceeds on that basis.
Conclusions:
It is true that one could argue that this judgment does not address perhaps some of the wider and more interesting questions that suggest themselves in the area of graffiti and intellectual property law. For example, the aforementioned issues related to illegality and also the interaction between the originality requirement and graffiti were not dealt with. On the latter point, would simpler works containing painted single words be deemed in many cases to fulfil the 'modicum of creativity' 58 that is now the US threshold for originality? It must also be borne in mind that typefaces are not protectable per se under US copyright law. 59 That having been said, the case does raise a number of pertinent issues concerning the evolving phenomenon of graffiti and how the law struggles to accommodate it. The case is all the more valuable in this regard given the paucity of judgments in this area, this due perhaps to the fact that the underlying nature and purpose of much graffiti is constructed around a 'core value of rebellion.' 60 Such artists seeing themselves as beyond mainstream culture and particularly the legal system, hence the thought of seeking legal remedy is culturally alien.
In terms of the issues this case does confront, perhaps the most central is the criteria (or arguably lack thereof) for determining what is 'recognised stature' and the inherent broad subjective nature of the designation of same. VARA draws a distinction between mutilation and destruction of a work in an attempt to balance competing property rights and those moral interests of the artist. In the context of mutilation, an artist must demonstrate damage to honour or reputation but with destruction the work must be of 'recognised stature'. 61 There is consistent tension in jurisprudence between merit free assessments in identifying projectable subject matter and the inherent and often unavoidable need to resort to exactly such criteria to solve ontological aesthetic quandaries and resultant legal taxonomic quandaries. 62 It may nonetheless be the case that some legislative guidance on the factors that are determinative for what constitutes recognised stature would indeed be warranted. 63 The use of language such as 'preserved for posterity', as per the Pollara 64 judgment is unhelpful in the extreme when dealing with many contemporary forms of artistic expression in this context.
On the issue of the section 113(d) provisions, which require notification to be furnished to the artist in a situation of impending destruction, it is arguable that these measures do not go far enough. 65 This section refers to 90 days' notice that needs to be given to the artist pre-destruction of the work but this apparently only applies if the owner of the building had intended the artwork be removed or destroyed. This wording thereby potentially leaves a gap in protection for artists in relation to situations where a contractor acts on their own volition unknown to the owner. 66 In this case it is factually unclear as to the circumstances but nevertheless it would seem reasonable to aver that this loop hole needs to be addressed in order to achieve a better balance of owners and artist's rights and also to allow prospective plaintiff's to apply for injunctive relief where this semantic lacuna may ultimately prevent them doing. 67 As noted above, VARA does indeed protect transient works but the questions remain as to the degree of transience permissible under the Act. The spectrum of case law in relation to fixation leaves a distinct lack of clarity. The Seventh 7 th Circuit in Kelley v Chicago Park District 68 held that an artist's wildflower garden was 'inherently changeable, not fixed' while in the regularly cited, and indeed criticised, decision of MAI Systems Corp v Peak Computers, even random access memory (RAM) copies of a work have been held to satisfy the fixation requirement by the Ninth Circuit. 69 There has previously been a view expressed that 'the proliferation of computer games may cause other courts to liberalize the fixation requirement', 70 but whether this will ultimately inform judgments concerning fixation decision in the artistic arena remains to be seen but it is without doubt that more clarification in this area is currently warranted.
The developing position of legal graffiti is undoubtedly highlighted by this case. When thinking of museums and galleries in the context of more traditional art, sites such as 5Pointz and the phenomenon known as free walls (areas provided for by city authorities or other property owners as a designated area for legal graffiti where the property owner retains some control over content) have come to act as a highly contextualised equivalent exhibitory forum for graffiti.
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The level of transience in works may fluctuate on a case by case basis, but examples such as the 5 Pointz which contain the added aspect of curatorship, do indicate that fixation may not be always necessarily at issue or at least to the extent previously thought.
The 'recognised stature' requirement indicates both a realignment (when compared with the honor and reputation threshold required in relation to mutilation) of the weighting of respective rights between the artist and the building owner but also is indicative of a 'preservative' cultural function in term of public policy. 72 The District Court makes further reference to the concerns of Congress in terms of 'significant societal loss' if such works are destroyed. 73 At this point one may ask whether it
